This paper presents an in-depth case study detailing the history, experiences and wider practitioner and policy lessons from a circular economy business model over a thirty-year period highlighting the successes, difficulties and conflicts of adopting a circular economy model. The case is based on interviews, key documents and customer insight. The findings demonstrate how sustained circular economy business practices can deliver significant new revenues, resource productivity and business continuity benefits, but also require managers and practitioners to develop competencies and capabilities, such as balancing linear and circular systems, to address complex and highly dynamic factors including rapid technological shifts and market volatility.
Introduction
The term circular economy (CE) has a long history, multiple definitions and distinctive developments in different global contexts 1 . In Europe and increasingly in other global regions a CE framework, originally devised and developed in the UK by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF) 2 , has been a catalyst at EU policy level 3 and has become influential in business circles. A key reason for the popularity of this framework, sometimes referred to as the 'butterfly model' (see Figure 1) is that it aligns a compelling business rationale 4 with the need to decouple wealth creation from the consumption of finite resources 5 .
Despite the growing interest in circular economy practices, there are few published empirically based evaluative studies into the actual experiences and outcomes within specific businesses through time. The present paper contributes to the literature by providing a detailed case study of the successes of implementing a circular economy system over many years via unprecedented access to a key manufacturer and combining the technical/design, supply chain, (reverse) logistics challenges also from a business model and management of a circular transition perspective. The case study also details the difficulties of trying to move away from the linear economy and how even the best laid plans and a management committed to the principles of CE can be challenged by external environmental factors. This provides an important first-hand insight for senior executives into the management journey of one of the communities best known CE-case examples in an industry which exhibits many similarities with many other manufacturing and high-tech businesses in a fast changing environment.
A circular economy aims to upgrade the linear take-make-dispose economy to one that is restorative by design 6 . One well-known visual depiction of a circular economy is shown in Figure 1 7 . In the technical sphere (right-hand side, and the focus of this paper) value creation lies in the ability to preserve the embedded labor, energy, material and capital costs in higher forms of product and component integrity and can be achieved through four primary ways 8 . Firstly, via performance business models 9 and maintenance which allows the extension of product usage 10 .Secondly, via recommerce (via reuse or redistribution), that is an existing product is resold to a new user with little or no rework. Thirdly, via refurbishment and remanufacturing 11 (using components to create new or extend the usage of existing products). Fourthly, via recycling (in which resources are extracted to their most basic and most interchangeable form e.g. by milling and remelting metals into new metal feedstock).
Resource decoupling therefore depends on the ability to spot opportunities and then extract higher value from reusing assets including products, components and their materials at the end of a use phase or find value added from recycling. Proponents of this circular economy model have argued that there is business opportunity and advantage from circular models when compared to traditional salesownership-disposal models. In the case of asset recovery for remanufacturing for example, the value of US remanufactured production is growing rapidly and recent national data valued the industry at $43.0 billion supporting 180,000 full-time US jobs 13 .
A number of the business opportunities and challenges of initiating and managing circular models such as remanufacturing and asset reuse have long been of interest to academic researchers and practitioners and been reported previously including optimal pricing strategies, branding and segmentation 14 , cannibalization issues 15 , feedstock challenges 16 , consumer acceptance 17 , reverse supply chain design 18 , and how often to remanufacture 19 . The profitable establishment of remanufacturing systems when there are high rates of innovation and short usage cycles, or in business-to-consumer markets, has also been identified as a major issue in positive business cases 20 .
Commercialization and Branding
The role of consumer acceptance and the question of whether or how remanufactured or reused products should be branded is highlighted here as a particularly important challenge facing managers. Companies develop brands for many reasons. Importantly a strong brand will differentiate the product and create a desire that goes beyond utility leading to desire and loyalty in consumers and commanding premium prices 21 . Goods and services in consumer societies are used as sense-making devices and brands form part of our extended self 22 . Brands succeed in part due to the influences that impact consumption. Marketing activity over many years has led consumers to believe that new is best and these influences from both marketers and other consumers can reinforce this opinion on the individual consumer. Giannias 23 points out that the quality of brands can be assumed from an analysis of the secondhand market for such brands. So, quality brands will also have a greater value in the preowned market. There are clearly a group of consumers that favor secondhand or reused goods based upon (amongst other things) their environmental concerns or as a deliberate attempt to be anti-ostentatious 24 .This group however is studied as a niche or minority group. One important aspect of this paper is to suggest that branding and marketing activity can perhaps reeducate consumers as to the value of products produced in a circular economy process.
In addition there are a number of well-known external barriers and policy challenges affecting trade in remanufactured goods and asset reuse vary by product and country 25 . These include transportation costs, the high price of cores (used components), import prohibitions/bans, foreign regulatory barriers, and tariffs. Few countries have legally defined remanufacturing and this is reported as the single largest barrier to increased sales of remanufactured goods 26 . Remanufactured goods are often categorized as used products, the importation of which may be restricted or banned.
The case presented here addresses all of the above issues and is distinctive in providing a detailed internal perspective and insight from managers into the interplay between these, and other challenges and how they combine and vary over time. The case also provides clarity into the specific framing and practice of a circular economy model as defined by circular economy thought leaders and drawing on our The following section outlines the case method utilized, followed by the case findings. The final sections present a synthesis and wider implications for managers, practitioners and policy makers followed by conclusions and future directions for practice and research.
Methodology
The methodology utilizes a single in-depth case study. Ricoh is a Japanese global printer, imaging and document management original equipment manufacturer (OEM) with a long-standing program in product manufacture, remanufacture and asset reuse. The company HQ is based in Japan with three Regional HQs covering the Americas (HQ Malvern, US), Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA, HQ London), and Asia, Pacific, China (HQ Singapore). The scale of remanufacturing varies by region; it is much lower in the US for example compared to Europe which in turn is lower than in Japan, partly due to the complex nature of the European market structure described later. The company has 110,000 employees, of which 17,000 are in Europe, across 230 consolidated companies with sales of 19Bn USD in 2016, making Ricoh the top-ranked company in its sector by turnover 28 . Japan accounts for 34% of sales by region, followed by the Americas (31%) and EMEA (24%). The company has a long-standing commitment to the environment and sustainability, winning many global awards and accolades over four decades 29 as well as a longstanding reputation for technical innovation.
The case is built upon close collaboration between the authors with key managers within Ricoh UK and Europe and was built via multiple-depth interviews, on-site visits and observational research, access to public and private company documents and customer insight. Quotes from interviews with managers across the business and dealerships are used to highlight key points. To facilitate the flow of the case study it will be narrated in chronological order and followed by a synthesis of implications for managers and policy observations at the end.
FINDINGS
The case starts in Time Period 0, before remanufacturing emerged in the UK for the first time.
Time Period 0: Emergence phase of remanufacturing 1980 -1994
In the 1980s and 1990s, the typical manufacturing cycle of a Ricoh copier or printer would be between 18 months and three years. After this period the company would typically begin the manufacture of an upgrade or successor model. At that time, the primary driver for the company was to ensure a throughput of (new) product in order to drive economies of scale within its production base. Similarly, the drivers for the sales force were linked to this production cycle. They were therefore focused on and incentivized to encourage customers to upgrade to new machinery at the end of each lease contract (typically between three and five years in duration). One consequence of this was a stockpile of copiers and printers being returned at the end of lease periods, but which still had not reached anywhere near the end of their useful life cycle 30 . Moreover the widespread prevalence of printers began to shift the market dynamics of the industry as a whole, increasing pressure on the price of machines, and shifting profits to consumables (toner) and the print contract.
The emergence of remanufacturing in the industry, dominated then by Xerox, Fujitsu and latterly Ricoh, was founded on a number of key axioms which created an alignment of capabilities and incentives for the entire industry to embrace remanufacturing and asset reuse as a natural extension of their core businesses 31 .Initially (early 1980s) import tariffs meant that it was attractive for printer OEMs to set up production facilities for new printers and cartridges within the EU. By ~2010 those tariffs were finally removed. As a result the removal of those tariffs, China and Taiwan make all new Ricoh printers and cartridges. The initial steps taken by Ricoh in formal remanufacturing came about largely by accident. A site in the UK, Telford started as a production plant in 1985, producing copiers, printers, faxes and toner cartridges for the European market. Initially, the site was successful and profitable in focusing on its core operations, however, by 1994, Ricoh was operating in Europe primarily on a leasing basis, and through growth (largely by acquisition) it recognized that its market was maturing and hence opportunities for further growth from manufacturing new machines were limited.
Commercial pressures, and the need to remain competitive and productive as a manufacturing site within Ricoh globally, meant that the UK site needed to diversify its production activities and the opportunity for remanufacturing was recognized.
However, in the mid-1990s, the company's approach to asset reuse was defined internally as 'reconditioning' or 'refurbishment' rather than being seen or managed as remanufacturing, and was managed separately from the core manufacturing business as a 'recycling division'.
While supplies, and third party traders was created to manage and coordinate the complex range of challenges including asset recovery, matching supply to demand, market place variations, and managing profits across a complex dynamic network.
As a result of the scaling up Ricoh Europe was beginning to face key strategic challenges: whether to differentiate the remanufactured product, and how to position this product in the marketplace. Developing a remanufacturing and asset reuse strategy was beginning to raise concerns within Ricoh about brand reputation (e.g. quality, reliability etc.) and also marketplace acceptance. With ambitions to grow the market a decision was taken in 2008 to review and develop specific branding for the remanufactured products in the UK, targeted at the UK public sector market, a pricesensitive customer segment that was also increasingly required to demonstrate commitments to 'green' procurement. This decision was not difficult as a new industry standard for remanufactured products -BS8887-220 34 had been published. Remanufacturing, as defined in BS8887-220, guarantees the original specification and the only distinction is that for a remanufactured product, the packing indicates that the product may contain recycled or reused parts. In all other respects they are identical, and therefore, from a customer perspective, it is essentially impossible to differentiate the two products.
As a result for the first time there was industry clarity over the term 'remanufactured' which was a major boost to Ricoh Europe in overcoming potential negative customer perceptions. As the only OEM to attain this standard, Ricoh was able to create a de facto monopoly in the remanufactured sector and this success led to the creation in 2011/12 of a European-wide brand -Greenline (See Figure 3) . These developments enabled the Greenline brand to grow to a sizeable operation with sales currently of around 10,000 machines per annum representing about 4% of total sales whilst also recovering and reusing 30 to 40% of all eligible toner cartridges sold within the European market.
In order to build up the remanufacturing from this base a second key issue for the 3R team was the collection and recovery of assets sold outside of its contract for initial service as approximately 40% of printers were not recovered at the end of contrac t or usage period. In the case of cartridges a review showed consumer perceptions of and willingness to return cartridges for remanufacture varied dramatically across markets which made it difficult to scale up and optimize a reuse strategy across such a large geographic area as Europe. One of the biggest challenges to overcome in developing the European cartridge remanufacturing business was, again, the complexity of the market. This necessitated dealing with 22 separate operating companies in 22 different countries, each with their own supply chains buying individually from manufacturers in China and distributing products in their local markets in different ways. Third-party non-Ricoh refillers also target empty cartridges, reducing the number of cartridges available in the remanufacturing supply chain.
As a consequence whilst return rates across Europe average around 20% they vary dramatically between markets ( Figure 4 ). The near 100% return figure in the Netherlands for example is incentivized by a rebate for every cartridge returned. In the Nordic countries there is no cost-effective infrastructure for consumers to return cartridges so they dispose locally to third parties. Germany and France have strongly developed cultures and systems to return products whereas in the UK, it has been normal practice to throw them away. The growth of the 3R program meant managers needed to be able to predict future demand and optimize profit opportunity across the network. Sporadic flows create variable and unpredictable utilization of remanufacturing and reuse capacity which in turn reduces the fixed cost recovery or creates additional costs 35 . Limited visibility of supply or ability to forecast supply accurately makes it difficult to set production and sales targets, balance out trade-offs between second use cycle and new assets, and adds risks and costs in terms of needing to hold excess inventory or potentially running out of stock 36 .
The 3R business model is based upon a 'value realization cascade' -a decision tree which was developed iteratively by managers in the 3R team to help define the optimum value that the company can realize from returning assets; both hardware (machines), as well as consumables and spare parts. The cascade process is embedded in the Ricoh EU-wide Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. The system extracts data remotely from all contracted machines (e.g. number of copies made) and is used to determine which route through the cascade a machine should take (i.e. the smaller the number of copies a machine has made the lower the cost of remanufacture as parts replacement levels will be lower). The real lesson from Ricoh is no matter how much the process is automated, the prioritization and routing of assets through the cascade requires continual iterations of manual intervention and management decisions. 
Until then we had been able to keep high price levels as a result of continuous innovation (B/W to color, analogue to digital). As the economic downturn from 2008 took hold the high prices started to murder us. Our main business model of leasing meant that we only fully became aware of the changed world (dramatic price decreases) at the time of contract expiries".
From 2009 onwards Ricoh set in place a number of actions to allow it to fight back in the market, to return to profitability and to build in organizational resilience such that its previous lack of agility, and the narrow product focus that had served it so well pre-downturn, but had been its Achilles' heel during the downturn, would not be repeated. Not only did Ricoh refine its organizational structure, merging or reducing divisions, optimizing operations and realigning responsibilities; it also took the opportunity to look at its key markets and the products and services offered in these.
Whilst new entrants were a possible threat Kersjes commented "that the three main US competitors, Lexmark, Hewlett Packard and Xerox, all had lower fixed costs.

They each however made a strategic decision to bet on growth in services adjacent to printing, made large non-core acquisitions but were unable to convert these to core revenues and margins. Ricoh took a different decision, instead acquiring all its key distributors and expanding its dealer network into emerging markets."
Since 2012 the company has seen revenues return to pre-downturn levels and its number one market share position restored. The principal driver for the restoration of the company's fortunes has been the complete overhaul of its main technology engine, towards a modular design, incorporating the latest technologies which have significantly reduced manufacturing and running costs whilst simultaneously enhancing functionality and allowing the company to build upon the connectivity value of its products.
The company now has a core product range that is cost-effective to manufacture, and that costs less to run, resulting in a lower total cost of ownership (TCO) for customers, and encompasses the convergence of technologies such as Android.
This allows the company to create new value through the use of User Applications directly embedded within, or importable to, the devices themselves. As a result the company has seen unit placements grow in the last three years which in turn has seen an upturn in feedstock availability for the reuse programs that the company deploys, as incumbent customers swap out their older devices to realize the inherent benefits of the newer, more efficient, more technologically advanced products that form the company's new product line-up.
Whilst remanufactured device costs remain relatively attractive versus a new device, efficiency gains in the running costs of new devices are reflected in a lower Total
Cost of Ownership (TCO), particularly on five-year lease contracts, and the 10% saving on a remanufactured machine is not sufficient to be attractive to many customers. One of the key resource productivity gains is in toner efficiency (33-40%) which is both beneficial in material terms but also a crucial determinant in overall running costs. Policy that dictates that every remanufactured item has to be demonstrably cheaper to make and distribute than a new product, and be approved by the Japanese HQ.
Comparing the economics of new machine production and remanufacture is complex and available is that material embedded in our current and future contracted fleet.
The company therefore has a built-in incentive to continue to pursue reuse mechanisms in whatever forms these may take and add new capabilities of design for remanufacture. Whilst the regional subsidiaries have a certain degree of autonomy, the emergence of the 3R strategy in T2 has been integrated across the global business in T3 and increasingly embedded in the company's three-year management plans that drive overall strategy 39 . The company has three global "3R communities", Europe, Asia and the US, all of which work within a global virtual matrix organization named "Business Solutions Group" run from Tokyo. Global best practice conferences are held annually at which the heads of each 3R community plus technical and commercial experts meet to discuss and deploy regional opportunity into global horizontal deployment of best practice. In the case of Europe monthly conference calls are held with the US community to share market intelligence and technical best practice (to avoid duplicating technical development and therefore waste cash). A good example of how that works in practice is the technology that was developed in the US to support the Latin American market for toner cartridge reuse (where price is always the main driver and piracy is rife) was deployed specifically in one European business group to help reduce service costs and make a previously unprofitable multi-million pound contract profitable. 
Synthesis and implications
Detailed case studies on corporate circular economy practices, as conceptualized in this paper, are nascent. The Ricoh case study represents a distinctive and detailed circular economy story encompassing a 35-year journey drawing on managerial and practitioner insights and perspective across four distinct time periods. It demonstrates in a single case the value creation opportunities from circular practices, previously depicted in Figure 1 40 . In this case the company's COMET Circle illustrates the various value creation opportunities from recovered product: the ability to capture this value relies on a wide range of capabilities, investments and enabling conditions.
The case adds detailed insights from managers and cost benefit data into how a balanced strategic portfolio management of reused assets, alongside the sale of new products, can reach new price-sensitive or environmentally conscious segments 41 , block counterfeits 42 , and capture new revenues and profit from recovered assets 43 .
The case vividly highlights the opportunity costs of not recovering and offering reused assets 44 . Time period 3 illustrated the dynamic responses required to the challenge of maintaining profitable remanufacturing systems when there are high rates of innovation and short usage cycles 45 .
The issue of branding provides an interesting twist to the story, showing both the potential of specific branding and certification to overcome customer concerns about the quality of 'reused' products, and the fresh challenges that emerge when new products with equivalent or better economic and environmental credentials create the potential for customer confusion. In this case the Greenline brand equity has been eroded and leaves open the question of future segmentation, product pricing and branding. It is perhaps important to look at branding holistically here. Rather than merely a sales opportunity, branding can be used to spread the message of, and philosophical support for, a CE model both internally (amongst employees) and externally (amongst customers). The role of branding as a means to educate and influence consumers is an important theme and area of future research to direct practice in this area.
Whilst the contribution of the case provides insight and better understanding of the specific aspects of asset reuse the more interesting and distinctive feature of the case is in showing the complex interplay between a wide range of challenges facing managers and practitioners, often simultaneously, over time.
The complex and nuanced interplay between economic, environmental and business continuity factors means that a circular economy is unlikely to scale up randomly and once established may itself come under threat. The Ricoh case study has demonstrated that the best intentions of a CE model have been threatened by the significant advances in manufacturing efficiency.
The role of circular economy building blocks
The first implication for managers and practitioners therefore is that the transition and scaling up of a circular model requires the continuous iteration of the four key levers previously described and a long-term view (Table 1) . Operating any one in isolation is unlikely to be successful or profitable. Many cradle-to-cradle products From a business model perspective it is widely acknowledged that the role of services is of growing significance to differentiation and competitive advantage both in terms of added value customer services (new delivery models, new service contracts, performance-based deals) but also ensuring product designs (see above)
are easy to service and can be repaired or remanufactured at least cost 48 . As the case indicates, for an OEM, operating these at scale requires a strategic decision of whether to actively recover third party (grey) markets or work with intermediaries and achieve economies of scale, scope and density.
Reaching scale has the potential for reducing reverse network costs and maximizing network profits which can be enhanced by improving the level of automation of remanufacturing by integrating management across all the circular economy loops in a compound fashion rather than focusing solely on individual loops (e.g. remanufacturing alone).
Individual firms can further influence broader system enablers and conditions in support of circularity by setting standards to drive down costs or promoting standards to influence consumer awareness and purchase decisions and supporting regulation for remanufacture and reuse (see discussion below on Policy).
The Ricoh story illustrates the growing complexity of the circular model over four time periods and at various stages, the need to manage critical inflexion points, and transitions at points of growth, scale-up and product innovation or technological change. As the case reveals, an established, profitable and resource-productive program is not immune from changing corporate strategy, financial circumstances, competitive pressures and technical innovation cycles. Moreover the case has shown the ability to extract higher value from reusing products, components and materials at the end of their first use phase, even if a strong business case is not a given. To take full advantage of the building blocks in Table 1 management teams must make a strategic decision to resolve some of the fundamental challenges and tensions in the businesses.
Managing challenges, tensions and trade-offs
Hence the second implication for managers from this study is that going circular and mainstreaming from relatively small and well-defined niche operations in remanufacturing will create tensions and conflicts with the entrenched way (the linear manner) of doing business. Accepting these tensions as inevitable and as an impetus and source for business model innovation is required to enable and empower future management teams to develop agility and apply their capabilities to circular economic changes, which can be hard to predict.
As the Ricoh case demonstrates a circular set-up is not a static system and through time the volatility of commercial pressures, regulatory change and faster innovation cycles requires capabilities to manage transitions back and forth and the need to be able to realign the circular model.
This requires committed resolution from management teams.
Two of the important aspects of managing such transitions is to:
1) Anchor circularity within the wider business by setting a clear, unambiguous target (e.g. the 2050 decoupling material vision of Ricoh) for scaling up the circular model to provide strategic direction for many of the long-term decisions, e.g. in upgrading technology and using natural discontinuities to replace existing capabilities with more circular ones.
In the case of Ricoh the COMET Circle has proved a critical framework to maintain the founding values of the company and its long-term commitment to environmental standards and innovation.
2) Be very cognizant of the many trade-offs and tensions in the short term and treat these as opportunities for further improving the management system and the day-to-day operations towards more circular practices over time.
Sustaining circular value creation and future policy requirements
The third implication is that Circular Economy business models are a potential source of growth, market share and profit for individual firms 49 . The interest in circular economy business practices as a source of new value creation is growing 50 although detailed evidence of cost/benefit comparisons to linear processes remains elusive, and this is one of the key directions for future research and practitioners (see below). As the Ricoh case illustrates however macro-economic and competitive pressures are a constant and circular economy propositions have to demonstrate their positive business contribution. The growing use of the term circular economy then raises important research questions across a wider range of business and industrial cases, for example how the concept is perceived, implemented, and managed alongside established environmental or sustainability strategies? Does it challenge current sustainability strategies or take them in a different direction, and if so how will these be managed internally? As the number of businesses beginning to test out circular economy practices increases there is a growing sample of companies to provide evidence to identify the specific challenges in adapting the Circular Economy concept to individual business problems.
Policy
It is further argued that remanufacturing also offers other benefits including the potential for reshoring parts and products, opportunities in improving national resource resilience and the potential for economic growth and the creation of skilled jobs. Further research into these wider macro-economic opportunities is required.
To achieve further growth and transition to a circular economy requires global cooperation between governments and businesses to ensure that key policy and system barriers to development are addressed. From the Ricoh study three areas of policy and cooperation are apparent.
Firstly the role of defined standards and nomenclature for remanufacturing to address consumer concerns regarding quality and performance, and overcome consumer uncertainty about the term remanufactured versus other terms such as refurbished, repaired or reconditioned 51 . This is an opportunity for marketing managers to really understand customer interpretation of CE offerings and then provide a compelling brand offering.
Approaches to defining and providing quality assurance for remanufacture vary by Finally Industry-wide metrics can also hinder the perception and recognition of remanufacturing. For example it is only since 2011 that Infosource (a market research organization for the office automation industry) has allowed remanufactured products to contribute to firms' overall market share figures. Ricoh and its competitors had to be careful to ensure that they did not fulfil their market share requirements through remanufactured product, highlighting how industry bodies and wider system conditions can inadvertently hold back potential growth in circular economy activities yet can be relatively easily adapted with industry agreement.
Conclusions
In sum there are many strategic reasons why firms initiate or scale up circular business practices. The claim and appeal to businesses is that this transition could be self-reinforcing by being profitable rather than solely requiring costly regulation 53 .
The circular economy framework provides an overarching conceptualization of a new type of economy, where products, components, services, materials and their byproducts circulate at their highest value for the longest period. The Ricoh case and COMET Circle highlight a successful case but also the complex interplay between investments in business models, product and service design, management of reverse flow infrastructure and networks and the ability to leverage key system conditions to reduce transaction costs. The day-to-day operation of a global circular economy model requires constant iteration and requires an overarching value asset decision tree and end-to-end visibility of stocks and flows of assets in the field, in itself requiring investment in information management and tools to manage complex system dynamics and anticipate future scenarios.
The shift to a circular economy is not straightforward, and the current transitional phases may collide against many entrenched features of the highly successful and much older linear economy model, which has delivered many benefits. However many features of our current economies are predicated on an era of low-cost, readily available resources and a system of national accounts which fail to take into account much of the degradation and degeneration of natural capital on which our entire economies and societies depend.
However, the responsibility for CE should not be left with manufacturing and operations managers. Marketing is very much needed to do its share and it is a change in the culture of consumers (including business users) that should be the focus of marketers.
There is no question that the industry has spent the best part of a century educating consumers that new is best. However, with marketing work this could change. A good example is the use of free plastic bags in supermarkets. The consumer always used to bring their own bags to the store until supermarkets educated them not to.
For 40-50 years the consumer then collected bags from the store. However, in the last two years (in England) a system of charging per bag has led to a major shift in behavior to ensure customers bring their own bags again.
Ricoh has many resilient circular features but is not immune to competitive market pressures, customer requirements and technological shifts. The COMET Circle and the Greenline brand demonstrate Ricoh's clear value system within its corporate brand 54 , and committing to a circular economy model has been a clear differentiator for the company. There are broader valuable lessons from this for the marketing profession in how to create consumer acceptance of preowned products. The lesson from this case is that it is possible to initiate large-scale circular models and navigate the complex and volatile challenges through transitional phases but these cannot be underestimated.
These four approaches are shown as the four feedback loops shown in Figure 1 . In a circular economy, these feedback loops operate as part of an overall system enabling product, components and materials to be circulated at their highest value for repeat use. The first EMF report (2012) demonstrated a $600Bn p.a. economic and business opportunity from the application of these approaches at scale when applied to a small number of common technical durable products in the EU economy, when compared to the linear base case. In this paper the term remanufacturing has a very specific meaning within the chosen case study. The lack of clarity over definitions of terms such as remanufacturing or refurbishment has been identified as one major barrier to trade and sale of products that have been recovered or returned for a second sale or rental. This point is picked up in the case study discussion. In this paper we refer to remanufacturing as an OEM or approved partner returning a product to a condition as good as or better than new with full warranty. We refer to asset reuse as an umbrella term to include any product or component that falls into the blue loops and green cascades in Figure 1 and avoids leakage to energy plants or landfill. The term reverse networks refers to the specific logistics arrangements -collection, sorting, segregation, inventory -to recover and return assets.
